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Notice to the reader 
The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999. This Treaty amends the 
Treaty on European Union and provides for the renumbering of the articles of both the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
As this work was started before 1 May 1999 and most of the content and the majority of 
references relate to the period before 1 May 1999, reference is made to the old 
numbering. 
The corresponding old and new numbers of the articles in this paper are: 
Old Number 
Article 85 
Article 86 
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New Number 
Article 81 
Article 82 
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INTRODUCTION 
The extra-territorial application of national competlt10n laws remains current in the 
international legal community for several reasons. Amongst these are the constant 
increase in cross border trade, the opening up of more markets, the increase in so called 
"mega-mergers" and the fact that no international competition rules exist. As a result 
international conflict relating to the assertion of jurisdiction is as intense as ever with the 
potential of ever increasing international conflict. 
In recent years the debate over the circumstances in which a country can assert 
jurisdiction over an extra-territorial economic activity, having anti-competitive effects 
inside its territory, has been reinvigorated. It is clearly illustrated by matters like the 
Gencor Lohnro merger1, the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, the Nippon Paper 
Industries case3 and the continued calls for the establishment of international competition 
laws and international competition authorities, the latest being the OECD Conference on 
Trade and Competition in Paris, 29-30 June 19994 . In the Genco /Lohnro case5 the 
European Communities competition authorities asserted jurisdiction over economic 
activities conducted within South Africa. The Boeing !McDonnell Douglas case6 focussed 
on the assertion of jurisdiction by the EC competition authorities over a merger between 
two American aircraft companies, co-operation between the European Union and United 
States competition authorities7 and the call for an international competition authority. 
The Nippon case8 illustrated the political sensitivity of the issues, seen in the light of the 
United States's chronically large trade deficit with Japan. In this case the United States 
asserted jurisdiction to a price fixing conspiracy that occurred outside the United States. 
Globalisation is a fact of modem business. Many companies now function on an 
international level and competition cases therefore have a significant international 
component. The Wall Street Journal reported on 30 November 1998, in one issue, on four 
mega-mergers: Exxon/Mobil, the number one and two oil companies in the United States, 
1 Gencor/Lohnro Commission Decision, Case IV/M.619, OJL 011 p. 30, 14.01.1997 
Gencor Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, Case T-102/96, Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 25.03.1999, not yet reported 
2 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Commission Decision IV/M. 877, OJL 336 of08.12.1997 
3 United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. Ltd C.A. 1 No. 96-2001 
4 OECD Conference on Trade and Competition, Paris, 29-30 June 1999, Information taken from OECD 
Homepage on Internet <http://www.oecd.org.dp/index.htm> 
5 Supra, at 1 
6 Supra, at 2 
7 Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Commission of the European 
Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, 23.09.1991, OJL 095/47, 1995 
See also Lampert "International Co-operation Among Competition Authorities" 1999 European 
Competition Law Review, 214 
8 Supra, at 3 
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to create the world's largest privately-owned oil company; Hoechst/Rhone-Poulec, to 
form the world's largest life-sciences company; Deutsche Bank/ Bankers Trust, to create 
the world's highest asset financial services group and Viag/Alusuisse Lonza, to become a 
global leader. Lately the Carrefour/Promodes merger has also featured in many papers. 
The continued growth in internationalisation of business activities increases the 
likelihood that anti-competitive practices in one country or the co-ordinated behaviour of 
firms located in different countries may adversely affect the interests of those countries. It 
may also increase the number of transnational mergers that are subject to the merger 
control laws of more than one country. The unilateral application of national legislation, 
in cases where business operations in other countries are involved, raises questions as to 
the respective spheres of sovereignty of the countries concerned. 
The South African competition authorities have to ensure that anti-competitive practices 
in foreign markets do not prevent South African companies from entering those markets, 
do not destroy competitiveness in South Africa or exploit South African consumers. The 
entry of direct foreign investors into South African markets may intensify competition in 
the domestic market, but can have negative effects if international investors simply start 
merging with large domestic firms. In order to regulate the creation of anti-competitive 
practices the South African competition authorities have to utilise their immediate 
instrument, the Competition Act 89of1998 (hereafter "Competition Act). 9 
The 1998 Competition Act provides specifically for the application of South African 
competition law "to all economic activity within, or having an effect within, the 
Republic" .10 Until now no case relating to the extra-territorial application of South 
African competition law has formally been brought before the South African Competition 
Board (Competition Commission in the Competition Act)11 and the South African Courts 
have handed down no judgement. However, in a number of cases informal discussions 
with other authorities have been conducted and some agreements have been reached with 
foreign businesses operating in the South African market. 
Chapter 1 looks at the provisions in South African law relating to the extra-territorial 
application of South African competition law, why it is important for the South African 
competition law to provide for the extra-territorial application, previous arrangements 
with business and the possible reaction of foreign nations to the assertion of jurisdiction 
by South African competition authorities over economic activities outside South Africa. 
Chapter 2 looks at the extra-territorial application of competition law in the European 
Union and Chapter 3 at the extra-territorial application of competition law in the United 
States Many other countries also provide for the extra-territorial reach of their 
competition laws, for example Germany. The extra-territorial reach of the German anti-
trust laws centre on the construction and application of Article 98(2) of the German 
9 Competition Act 89 of 1998, in force from 1 September 1999 
10 Competition Act 89 of 1998 Section 3 
11 The Competition Board ceases to exist under the Competition Act 89of1998. The Act establishes a 
Competition Commission, a Competition Tribunal and a Competition Appeal Court. 
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Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen: "Dieses Gesetz findet Anwendung auf alle 
Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, die sich im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes auswirken, 
auch wenn sie ausserhalb des Geltungsbereichs dies es Gesetzes veranlasst werden ... " 
Accordingly, this statute applies to all restraints of competition, which have an effect 
within the territorial scope of the statute, even when they are caused outside of the 
territorial scope of the statute. However, this paper is limited to a discussion of the 
situation in the European Union and United States for two reasons: Firstly, South Africa, 
the United States and the European Union have always been close trading partners; 
secondly, both the European Union and the United States apply some form of "effects"-
doctrine to establish jurisdiction in the extra-territorial application of their competition 
laws and this doctrine will also give the South African competition authorities the 
necessary jurisdiction in extra-territorial competition matters. Many lessons can therefore 
be learnt form the experiences of the European Union and United States in this regard. 
Competition law can only react to cross-border anti-competitive behaviour in a limited 
way. In Chapter 4 international law limits on the extra-territorial application of 
competition laws will be discussed and possible solutions to the problems. There are no 
existing binding rules relating to the practices of private firms at the multilateral level. 
From their very nature national competition rules can only have domestic effect in the 
absence of binding rules at the international level. As competition policy aims to create a 
level playing field for all players on the market, it is important to consider new 
instruments for the common application of competition rules for example through 
agreements with South Africa's closest business partners. 12 Closer co-operation with other 
countries in the form of specific notification procedures, internationally accepted time 
limits, common criteria for evaluating cases, exchange of information and consultation 
may prevent unnecessary friction with the main South African trading partners. Bilateral 
agreements, such as the one between the European Unon and the United States to 
promote co-operation and co-ordination and multilateral agreements within the 
framework of the WTO and OECD will be looked at. 13 
12 Van Miert "What does a level playing field mean in the global economy?" Speech presented to the Davos 
World Economic Forum on January 30, 1998 
13 Agreement Regarding the Application of Competition Laws with the United States on 23 September 
1991 4/1991 Common Market Law Reports 823-831 
Van Miert "Transatlantic Relations and Competition Policy" 1996 Competition Policy Newsletter Vol. 2 
Number 3 at 1 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN COMPETITION 
LAW 
1.1 The need for rules relating to the extra-territorial application of competition laws 
Because the ability to monitor anti-competitive practices are severely limited via national 
means it is crucial to be able to address private anti-competitive practices at an 
international level. Many countries are currently re-writing their competition laws to fill 
this vacuum, in part stimulated by international cartels that have hurt consumers world-
wide. 
Joel Kleyn, head of the United States anti-trust division, at the OECD Conference on 
Trade and Competition in Paris 29-30 June 1999 observed that: "Over 80 countries now 
have anti-trust laws of some sort and another 20 or so countries are drafting such laws. 
Over 50 countries have pre-merger notification regimes of some sort and many anti-trust 
agencies not only in major industrialised countries but also in many developing countries 
have active anti-trust enforcement programs". In May 1999 the United States for example 
fined several participants in an international vitamins cartel that operated successfully for 
almost a decade. A Swiss and a German firm pleaded guilty and agreed to pay the largest 
criminal fines in anti-trust history, $725 million. 14 
Businesses operate on a global level and business activity may be organised in a way that 
escapes sanctions of a specific national authority. The same business activity may fall 
within the jurisdiction of two or more competition authorities, each applying its own 
national rules with the possibility of conflict all too apparent. Co-operation between 
authorities is therefore crucial. 
The challenges associated with the dismantling of classical trade barriers remain high. In 
the absences of state protection companies may act to restrict the ability of new entrants 
to gain a foothold in their traditional markets. Competition concerns can also arise in the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises when, as a condition of purchase, the foreign 
multi national demands those governments erect barriers to entry or permit certain pricing 
practices. Often, developing countries hungry for foreign investment may have no choice 
but to give in to these demands. 
Action against mergers must be carefully analysed, this means blocking only mergers that 
are likely to harm consumers or setting conditions that allow mergers to go forward 
14 
"Vitamin Cartel" 1999 Global Competition Review at 7 
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without inhibiting competition. It is therefore important to form a global view of the 
operation by gathering as much information about the operation on a world-wide scale. 
Competition policy is active in a constantly changing area and should not loose sight of 
the importance of reviewing regulations, some of which can inhibit competition and 
others which can help competition. 
The South African authority must prevent practices outside South Africa from destroying 
companies and competition inside South Africa or exploit South African consumers. It is 
important to ensure a fair play ground for all the market players. 
It is also important for the South African authority to prevent anti-competitive practices 
in third markets from blocking the entry of South African companies to those markets. 
1.2 South African Competition legislation 
1.2.1 Competition legislation before 1955 
Prior to the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act 54of1955, competition policy in 
South Africa, was reflected in numerous individual Acts dealing with a specific sector for 
example, the Board of Trade and Industries Act 33 of 1924, the Patents, Designs, Trade 
Marks and Copyright Act 9 of 1916 and the Profiteering Act 27 of 1920.15 These Acts 
regulated situations unique to South Africa and as such were never enforced in matters 
relating to the subject of this paper. 
1.2.2 Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act 25of1955 
The 1955 Act provided mainly for the prevention and control of monopolistic conditions 
and some other incidental matters. Section 2 stated that the Act should apply to all 
monopolistic conditions which "has or is calculated to have the direct effect of..." The 
Section then proceeds to list these effects in (i) to (vi). 
The Act took the form of an enabling measure and contained no per se prohibition. It 
provided for each monopolistic condition to be judged in accordance with the public 
interest. The Board of Trade and Industries could undertake formal investigations if so 
directed by the Minister. If its investigations revealed monopolistic conditions, which 
were not justified in the public interest, the Board had to recommend suitable remedial 
steps. 
15 Mouton en Lambrechts "Competition Policy in the Republic of South Africa" 1982 Modern Business 
Law58 
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In the period 1955-1979, the Board investigations resulted in four prosecutions and 
convic~ions, none having a "foreign nature". 
It is the view of this author, that if ever the Board was presented with a scenario of a 
monopolistic condition (as defined in the Act) which satisfied the "public interest"- test, 
whether the condition was created or controlled from outside the Republic or between 
foreign firms, the Act would have given the necessary jurisdiction. 
1.2.3 Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 96 of 1979 
The 1979 Act provided for all aspects of South African competition law at the time, 
including mergers. The Competition Board was empowered to investigate acquisitions, 
restrictive practices and monopoly situations. Like the 1955 Act, the 1979 Act constituted 
an enabling measure, containing no per se prohibitions. Each restrictive practice had to be 
investigated separately and judged according to the principle of public interest. Similarly, 
with regard to acquisitions, the Board had to inquire whether or not these were restrictive 
of competition. No merger or restrictive practice, however undesirable from the point of 
view of competition, was directly prohibited in the Act itself. 
Section 1 of the Act defined a "restrictive practice". According to the section a restrictive 
practice exists when three elements are simultaneously present-
( a) a restriction on competition, direct or indirect; 
(b) the restriction has or is calculated to have one or more of 7 effects stated in the 
section; and 
( c) the restriction of competition is caused by one or more of four stated conditions 
In other words a restrictive practise exist if competition is restricted either directly or 
indirectly, by any act or omission or situation. 
As in the 1955 Act there was no specific provision for the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Act and the question of extra-territorial application was never formally addressed under 
the 1979 Act. Looking at the wide description above, it seems clear that the Board was 
empowered to investigate matter outside the Republic, if it became necessary. The Board 
indicated in its Report 20 that it could take cognisance of an acquisition occurring outside 
South Africa if such acquisition had a negative effect on competition in South Africa. 16 
16 Report on the Board's investigation into alleged acquisitions by Anglo American Corporation of South 
Africa and De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited Goldfields of South Africa, January 5, 1989 
Page 10 of37 
1.2.4 Competition Act 89 of 1998 
The introduction of the 1998 Act heralds an exciting development in South African 
competition law. It is clear that previous laws did not address the extra-territorial aspect 
of competition law effectively. The focal point of the extra-territorial issue in South 
African Competition Law can be found in Section 3 of the Competition Act 89of1998: 
"The Act applies to all economic activity within, or having an effect within the Republic." 
This sentence embodies the codification of the "effects" concept in South African 
competition law. The doctrine is based on the principle that the criterion for applying 
competition law to a particular situation is not the geographical location of the anti-
competitive action, but the location of the anti-competitive effect. The Act intends to 
achieve in a general sense that all restraints of competition having a domestic effect can 
be prohibited regardless of where and by whom such restraints were agreed upon. The 
only limitations are those stated in Section 3 (a)-(d). 
The economic activity referred to in Section 3 includes restrictive horizontal practices 
(Chapter 2, Section 4), restrictive vertical practices (Chapter 2, Section 5) and an abuse of 
a dominant position (Chapter 2, Section 6). Certain practices are outright prohibited. 
The conditions for the application of the South African merger provisions are set out in 
Chapter 3, Section 11 and 12. According to Section 11 the Minister must in consultation 
with the Competition Commission and by Notice in the Gazette as soon as the Act comes 
into operation and thereafter at intervals of not less than five years 
(i) determine the threshold of combined annual turnover, or assets, in the Republic, either 
in general or in relation to specific industries, at or below which Chapter 3 does not apply 
to amerger; 
(ii) determine a second threshold of combined annual turnover, or assets, in the Republic, 
either in general or in relation to specific industries, higher than the threshold referred to 
in (i), for the purpose of determining the categories of mergers (being an intermediate 
merger or a large merger as defined in Article 11(3)); and 
(iii) provide a method for the calculation of annual turnover and assets. 
"Merger" is defined as being the direct or indirect acquisition or direct or indirect 
establishment of control, by one or more persons over all significant interests in the 
whole or part of the business of a competitor, supplier, customer or either person, whether 
that control is achieved as a result of 
(a) purchase or lease of the shares, interest, or assets of that competitor, supplier, 
customer or other person; 
(b) amalgamation or combination with that competitor, supplier, customer or other 
person; or 
( c) any other means 
No mention is made of international law limits, comity considerations or more practical 
limitations relating to the international competence of the Competition Commission, the 
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Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court. In essence the "effects"-principle is not 
limited in any way. This means that the South African "effects"-principle is much wider 
than the American "effects"-principle or the European Union version thereof. 
The deficiency of an exclusively "effects"-based approach to extra-territoriality has 
become apparent in the United States during the last decade (also in Germany where a 
pure "effects" doctrine was followed) and both countries have taken steps to remedy it. 
Looking back at the original hostile response to the strict application of the "effects"-
principle in the United States, it is surprising that the South African legislator did not 
attempt to limit the principle. As it stands it will be for the Tribunal and the Competition 
Appeal Court to apply the pure "effects" test or to limit it by way of a "rule of reason" 
approach or comity principles. 
1.3 Application of South African competition legislation to economic activity outside 
South Africa or between concerns not incorporated in South Africa 
In December 1998 the British based parent Cadbury Schweppes plc of Cadswep (55% 
owned by the parent) announced an agreement with Coca-Cola to sell its soft drinks 
brands to the United States drinks company. The agreement covered trademark ownership 
for all Cadbury Schweppes major soft drink brands outside South Africa, France and the 
United States. Initially it was expected that the South African competition authorities 
would block the sale in South Africa. 11 However, the Competition Board cleared the deal. 
The Board stated that it could only block a merger if it was shown that the merger would 
reduce competition. Coca-Cola has a market share of 83 percent in South Africa and 
Schweppes' share was estimated at about 15 percent. The evidence before the Board 
proved that the competition situation post-merger would have been the same as the 
current situation. The Competition Board observed that the deal would not change the 
competitive landscape in South Africa, since Coke has bottled and distributed the 
Cadbury brands since 1960 in South Africa. According to Coca Coal spokesman, Ben 
Deutsch, the acquisition would only marginally contribute to Coke's volume and this 
would not affect the way these brands are currently marketed. The Board did reserve the 
right to re-open the matter, should the situation change in the future or new information 
be presented to the Board. 18 
Recently the Competition Board also entered into informal discussions with the parties 
relating to the BAT/Rothmans merger. 19 Although the merger would have given rise to a 
95% market share, the Board declined to undertake a formal investigation. During the 
17 
"Cadswep gains on Coca-Cola deal" 1999 Reuters News Services 05/07/99 
18 Reuters News Service, 07/07/99, 02/09/99 
19 Case IV/M.1415of17 March 1999 
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informal discussions serious anti-competitive issues were raised and the parties undertook 
to dispose of some pipe tobacco interests to an empowerment group.20 
1.4 Possible reaction of foreign nations to the assertion of jurisdiction by the South 
African authority 
Judging by the reaction to United States assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in anti-
trust matters foreign nations may: 
(i) protest by way of diplomatic notes in the initial phase. 
(ii) enact statutes to impede discovery outside South Africa. The first "blocking" 
discovery was enacted by the Parliament of Ontario in response to a United States 
investigation of the Canadian newsprint industry in 1947.21Generally such statutes make 
the provision of certain evidence unlawful. Some prohibit compliance with foreign 
judgements. 
(iii) enact statutes rendering certain types of South African anti-trust judgements 
unenforceable in foreign courts, for example the Australian Foreign Proceedings (Excess 
of Jurisdiction) Act 198422 • Non-enforcement of judgements is done on the basis of 
international law. In the wake of the Westinghouse case23 , South Africa enacted the 
Protection of Businesses Act 99of1978. The Act includes provisions that protect natural 
and juristic persons against foreign judgements that give the plaintiff multiple 
compensation. The Act also provides that a wide ranging number of judgements given 
outside the Republic may not be enforced in its territory. 
(iv) enact legislation to recover damages paid in satisfaction of South African anti-trust 
judgements, "clawback" legislation.24 Clawback provisions support the non-recognition of 
judgements enabling anti-trust judgement debtors to strike back at treble compensation 
awards by recovering damages from the plaintiff that are in excess of actual damages. 
20 Information obtained from Mr. Wouter Meyer, South African Competition Board. Letter on file with 
author. 
21Business Records Protection Act, R.S.O., BB Rule 19.6.l (b) T.2 pp. 227-9 ch 54 (1970) (Can.) Comment 
in 1978 Texas International Law Journal Volume 8 at 57 
22 No. 3, Australian. Acts 1984 
23 Westinghouse Electric Corporation v Rio Algom Ltd 617 F2d 1248 
24 Neuhaus "Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under International Law", 
81/1981 Columbia Law Review at 1097 
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1 :5 Jurisdiction under International law 
Under international law, a state has prescriptive jurisdiction over individuals where it has 
a substantial, direct and foreseeable relationship with the conduct of the individuals. 
There are several jurisdictional principles which are recognised under international law 
and which serve as basis for the extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction for example, 
universality, nationality and territoriality for example. The appropriateness of a particular 
principle depends on the nature of the conduct over which jurisdiction is being extended. 
The Permanent Court of Justice recognised the possibility of extra-territorial jurisdiction 
in the Lotus case.25 Many states have relied on an objective notion of in competition law 
cases for example the European Union in the Wood pulp case. 26 This case confirmed that 
the Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to anti-competitive conduct 
occurring outside the European Union is limited by the international territoriality 
principle as universally recognised in international law. 
The German proceedings relating to the Philip Morris/Rothmans21 transaction provide a 
good illustration of how international law considerations can be incorporated in a merger 
analysis. The Federal Cartel Office blocked a merger between two non-European Union 
based multinationals, Philip Morris (US) and Rothmans (South Africa). The order aimed 
at preventing the merged enterprise from acquiring a dominant position in the German 
market. The South African Government objected to the proceedings. It argued that the 
actions of the Federal Cartel Office would violate the international law principles of non-
intervention because they would violate the rights of South African nationals to dispose 
of the foreign assets. 
The Federal Cartel Office based its decision on the "effects" principle, which is 
recognised by international law and which established the jurisdiction of a state to 
regulate matters that have a direct effect within its borders. It stated that limitations on the 
authority can only result from the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of 
other states as well as the international law prohibition on abuse of jurisdiction. Abuse of 
jurisdiction relates to the disproportionateness between the domestic regulatory interests 
and the disadvantages that the affected foreign enterprise or the corresponding states 
suffer through the issuance of the sovereign act. 
The FCO's non-intervention principle required that the respective governmental interests 
be weighed according to a defined standard. Only when the interests of the foreign state 
in the execution of the merger significantly outweigh the German interest in preventing it, 
can there be a violation of the non-intervention principle. 
25 The Lotus Permanent Court oflntemational Justice. Serie A No 10 Serie C No 13-11 September 7, 1927 
26 Cases C 89, C104, Cl 14, Cl 16, Cl 17, and 125-129/85, Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and others. v Commission 
of the European Communities 27 September 1988 European Court Reports 5193 at 5243 
27 Decision ofKammergericht of July 1, 1983 Kart 16/82. The English version was published in 4 CCH 
Common Market Reporter par 40 571 
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CHAPTER2 
THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
COMPETITION LAW 
2: 1 Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the European Communities competition rules namely, Article 
85 and Article 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community28 and 
the European Community Merger Regulation 4064/89 (hereafter Merger Regulation)29 are 
in certain cases applicable to economic transactions between undertakings situated 
outside the territory of the 15 Member States of the European Union. 
Article 85 (1) of the Treaty provides: 
"The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall 
hereby be prohibited; any agreement between enterprises, any decision by associations of 
enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade between the 
Member States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition within the Common Market" 
In Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and others v Commission (hereinafter "Wood pulp decision")30 
the European Court of Justice stated that Article 85 is applicable to agreements concluded 
outside the European Union but implemented within the European Union. 
Article 86 of the Treaty provides: 
"Any abuse by one or more enterprises of a dominant position within the Common 
Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common 
Market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States". 
Article 86 is applicable even when non-European Union undertakings abuse their 
dominant position in the Community, the existence of a dominant position in the 
Community giving territorial jurisdiction. 
In terms of Regulation 4064/8931 the Commission has the necessary jurisdiction to 
investigate a concentration when the world and Community thresholds are met. The place 
28 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 15, 1957 
Lastly amended by the Amsterdam Treaty, May 1999 
29 OJL 395, 31.12.1989, OJL 257, 21.09.1990 last amended by Council Regulation 1310/97 of30 June 
1997, OJL 180/1, 09.07.1997 
See also Bellamy and Child Common Market Law of Competition 4th Edition (1993 )paras 2-125 
30 Supra, at 26 
31 Supra, at 29 
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of business of the undertaking plays no role. The latest case in which this matter was 
discussed was the merger between Gencor/ Lohnro32 and the subsequent judgement.33 
2:2 Extra-territorial application of Article 85 
In 1964 the European Commission already dealt with the extra-territorial application of 
their competition laws and looked at the so-called "effects"-doctrine.34 In Beguelin Import 
v. G.L. Import Export the European Court of Justice did not give a ruling to this extent, 
but there were some dicta which suggested that the Court might approve of the effects 
doctrine.35 The Court dealt with an agreement where one of the parties was situated in a 
foreign country, but the agreement had an effect in the common market. 
It was not until 1972 when Advocate General Mayras specified the requirements for an 
effect to trigger the extra-territorial application of Article 85 and 86 in Imperial Chemical 
Industries v Commission36(known as the "Dyestuffs" -case). These requirements are that it 
should imply a direct and immediate restriction of competition and it should be 
reasonably foreseeable by the infringing undertaking and the effect produced must be 
substantial.37 The Court exercised jurisdiction over the parent company by means of the 
subsidiaries based within the Community. The judgement however, does not contain a 
specific ruling on the "effects" -doctrine. Instead the Court based its judgement on the 
"economic entity" doctrine which justified the fact that the Commission had taken 
jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality principle.38 
The European Court of Justice went behind the legal distinction between parent and 
subsidiary undertakings and said that ICI (although registered outside the EC), by making 
use of its power to control subsidiaries in the community, was able to ensure that its 
decisions were implemented in the common market. The fact that the subsidiary was a 
"separate legal entity" was not sufficient to exclude the possibility of imputing its conduct 
to the parent company.This approach was also followed in the Continental Can case39 • 
In 1984 the European Commission asserted jurisdiction on the basis of the "effects" -
doctrine in the Wood pulp Decision.40 It was said that jurisdiction can be asserted over 
conduct which has occurred wholly outside the territory of the state claiming jurisdiction, 
justified because of the consequential economic effects within the territory of that state.41 
32 Supra, at 1 
33 Supra, at 1 
34 Commission Decision Grosfilex-Fillestorf, OJ 581915 of 9 April 1964 and Commission Decision 1 June 
1964, Bendix-Mertens en Straet, OJ 9211426of10 June 1964 
35 EC Court of Justice Case 22/71 of25 November 1971, European Court Reports 1971, 949 
36 European Court Reports 1972, 630, Court of Justice Case 48/69 
37 Opinion at 687-694. 
38 Mann "The Dyestuff Case in the Court of Justice of the European Communities" International law 
Quarterly Review (22) 1973 at 35 
39 Case 6/72 1973 European Court Reports 219 
40 19 December 1984, Case IV.29.725 OJ L 8511 of26 March 1985 
41 Van Gerven "EC Jurisdiction in Anti-trust Matters: The Wood Pulp Judgement" 1989 Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute (Hawk ed. 1990) 451at463 
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The Commission sued non-EC wood pulp producers for alleged restrictive practices that 
were a restraint of trade within the Common Market. Some defendants argued that there 
was no jurisdiction over them because they were located outside the Common Market. 
The Commission stated that "Article 85 of the EC Treaty applies to restrictive practices 
which may affect trade between Member States even if the undertakings and associations 
which are parties to the restrictive practices are established or have their headquarters 
outside the Community, and even if the restrictive practices in question also affect 
markets outside the EC". 
The Commission argued that the economic effect was substantial and intended as 
"shipments affected by these agreements and practices amounted to about two-thirds of 
total shipments of bleached sulphate wood pulp to the Community and some 60% of 
Community consumption" and that "the agreements and practices appeared to have 
applied to at least the vast majority of the sales of the relevant products by the parties 
during the relevant periods". 
The effect was direct as the producers were "exporting directly or doing business within 
the Community" and the concerted practices "concerned shipments made directly to 
buyers in the Community or sales made in the Community to buyers here". 
In order to establish a territorial link with the Community the Commission set an 
implementation requirement. Implementation was defined as trading into the Community. 
This meant that jurisdiction did not arise from the concerted practices of the pulp 
companies, which were situated outside the Community, but from their conduct namely 
direct trading in the Community or using sales offices or agents to trade in the 
Community (similar to the IC! case mentioned above).42 Torremans observed that the 
economic entity doctrine, as applied in the IC! case could not be applied as, depending on 
the pulp company involved, there were either no subsidiaries in the Community or the 
control exercised over them was not substantial enough.43 
Subsequently, the European Court stated clearly that Article 85 of the Treaty applies to 
restrictive practices which may affect trade between Member States even if the 
undertakings and associations which are parties to the restrictive practices are established 
or have their headquarters outside the Community and even if the restrictive practice in 
question also affects markets outside the Community.44 The Court asserted jurisdiction 
over the firms outside the Community by the fact that they implemented a price fixing 
agreement (reached outside the Community) by selling to purchasers within the 
Community. 
Although Advocate General Darmon argued strongly in support of the "effects" -doctrine, 
that Article 85 applied whenever an effect on inter-state trade was found, the Court did 
42 Lange and Sandage The Wood pulp Decision and its implications for the scope of the EC Competition 
Law, 1989 26 Common Market Law Review 137-159 
43 Torremans" Extraterritorial application of EC and U.S. Competition Law" 1996/8 European Law 
Review 284 
44 Supra, at 26 
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not use the term "effects" -doctrine, but laid down an implementation requirement. It is 
the implementation of an agreement or a concerted practice in the Community that gives 
jurisdiction to the Commission. Implementation is defined in terms of engaging in a 
transaction with a Community customer, meaning a transaction involving the price, 
quantity or quality or a product sold to a Community customer. 
The Court therefore did not advocate an unrestricted application of the "effects" -
doctrine. The KEA passage of the judgement indicates that the effect should be direct and 
the implementation requirement seems to imply that the effect should be substantial and 
intended. 45The judgement drew much criticism based on the fact that the court had 
actually applied the direct "effects" - doctrine without due justification and qualification. 
It is now, however, accepted by many. writers that the European Court of Justice has 
applied the "effects"- doctrine" in all but name".46 
Following the Wood pulp case the Commission has used the concept of implementation 
widely to assert jurisdiction over questionable conduct, for example in the case of a 
Norwegian producer of PVC that allegedly participated in a price fixing cartel,47 and with 
regard to price fixing and set quotas by suppliers oflow-density polyethylene.48 
2:3 Extra-territorial Aapplication of Article 86 
The extra-territorial application of Article 86 does not cause specific international 
problems because of the requirement of a dominant position within the Common Market. 
The jurisprudence relating to Article 86 do not contain any reference to the "effects" -
doctrine. The Wood pulp doctrine relates specifically to restrictive agreements. Similarly 
the Commission decisions on Article 86 does not specifically mention the extra-territorial 
application of Article 86. The Commission has, however, applied sanctions to 
undertakings situated outside the Community in terms of Article 86. These decisions 
being approved by the European Court of Justice. In Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and 
Commercial Solvents v Commission49 (the Commercial Solvents case) the Commission 
fined CSC, an American partnership and ICI, the Italian daughter, because they refused to 
supply essential materials to the Italian concern Zoja. In Europemballage and 
Continental Can v Commission50 (the Continental Can case) of 21 February 1973 
45 Ferry "Towards Completing the Charm; The Woodpulp Judgement" 1989 European Competition law 
Review 58-73 
46 Friend "The long arm of Community Law, European Law Review." 169, 1989 
Van Gerven "EC Jurisdiction in Anti-trust Matters: the Wood Pulp Judgement" Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute. 1990 ed (1989) 
47 Re the PVC Cartel: The Community v Atochem SA, OJ L74/1, 14 1989 
48 Re the LdPE Cartel: The Community v Atochem SA OJ L 74121, 35 1989 
49 6-7 /73, European Court Reports 1974 223 
50 6-72, European Court Reports 1973, 215 
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Continental Can was accused of an abuse of its dominant position by obtaining control 
over a competitor via the interference of a daughter concern Europemballage. 
2:4 Extra-territorial application of the Merger Regulation 
The source of the European Commission's jurisdiction over concentrations is Council 
Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings the European Community Merger Regulation51 • The Commission has 
jurisdiction in respect of the transaction if (i) it qualifies as a concentration and (ii) has a 
Community dimension. "Concentration" refers to a change in control over another 
undertaking. 52 The concept includes mergers, acquisitions and "full function" joint 
ventures. 53 
The wide scope of the Commission's authority to review and prohibit transactions outside 
the Community is not the result of the definition of a concentration, but the implications 
of the definition of "Community dimension". According to the Merger Regulation 
concentrations have a Community dimension if in the last year the undertakings had a 
combined world-wide turnover ofECU 5 billion and at least two of the undertakings each 
had a turnover in the Community of ECU 250 million. If each of the undertakings 
concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its Community-wide turnover in one and the 
same Member State the concentration will not have a Community dimension even if the 
thresholds mentioned above are exceeded. 54 
If the concentration does not meet the thresholds under the above test, it may still be 
considered as having a Community dimension if it meets a further test. A concentration 
has a Community dimension under the supplementary test if in the last year: 
(i) the combined aggregate world-wide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more 
than ECU 2 billion; 
(ii) in each of at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the 
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100 million; 
(iii) in each of these three Member States, the aggregate turnover of each of at least two 
of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 20 million; and 
(iv) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of at least two of the undertakings 
concerned is more than ECU 100 million. 
Article 1 does not require that, in order for a concentration to be regarded as having a 
Community dimension, the undertaking in question must be established in the 
Community or that the production activities covered by the concentration must be carried 
51 Supra, at 30 
52 Commission Notice on the concept of a concentration 1998 OJ C 66 at 5 
53 For a description of full function joint-ventures see, Commission Notice on the concept of full function 
joint-venture, 1998 OJ C 66 
54 Commission Notice on the notion of undertakings concerned 1994 OJ C 385 at 12 and Commission 
Notice on calculation of turnover 1994 OJC 385 at 21 
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out within Community territory. The specific geographic location of the companies is 
therefore not important in deciding whether a concentration exists. 
The Commission has asserted jurisdiction over the merger of two non-European Union 
undertakings,55 over the acquisition of joint control over a non-European Union 
undertaking by an European Union undertaking and a non-European Union undertaking56 
and the acquisition of sole control of a non-European Union undertaking by a 
non-European Union undertaking. 57 
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger was an example of the last scenario. On 19 
March 1997 the European Commission announced that they would proceed with an in-
depth investigation into the proposed merger between Boeing Company and the 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC), both American. The transaction involved the 
acquisition by Boeing, a company that accounts for roughly 60% of the sales of large 
commercial aircraft of a direct competitor in a market in which there is only one other 
significant rival, Airbus Industries, a European consortium. It was only after substantial 
last-minute concessions by Boeing, that the merger was authorised on 23 July 1997 by 
DG IV, the Competition authority of the European Union. 58 The United States Federal 
Trade Commission earlier cleared the merger.59 The Federal Trade Commission based its 
decision on the view that McDonnell Douglas did not constitute a meaningful 
competitive force in the commercial aircraft market and that there was no economically 
plausible strategy McDonnell Douglas could follow to change this prospect.60 The merger 
had the support of the Clinton administration and the United States Vice-President, Al 
Gore, gave a warning that the United States would take action to prevent the EC 
Commission from blocking the merger by going to the World Trade Organisation or 
possibly imposing trade sanctions.61 "The European Union can't tell American companies 
how to do business" and "It seems ludicrous for the European Union to turn around and 
dismiss the Federal Trade Commission ruling" were statements made by Jim Talent, a 
Missouri Republican in the House of Representatives. 62 Similar comments were heard 
from Norm Dick when he warned that "we could be heading for a major trade war with 
the European Union over this" and if the Europeans make "umealistic demands, the 
United States government is going to have to retaliate" .63 Throughout the saga the 
55 Case IV/M.985 Credit Suisse/Winterthur October 15, 1997, Case IV/M.642 Chase Manhattan/Chemical 
Banking October 26, 1995, Case IV/M.1138 Royal Bank of Canada/Bank of Montreal April 1, 1998 
56 Case IV/M.619 Gencor/Lohnro 1997 OJL 11at30, Case IV/M. 236 Ericsson/Ascom July 8, 1992, Case 
IV/M.648 McDermott/ ETPMNovember 27, 1995 
57 A non-exhaustive list includes: Case IV/M. 1120 Compaq/Digital, Boeing/ McDonnell Douglas Case 
IV/M.877 1997 OJ 336 at 16, Case IV/M. 069 Kyowa/Saitama Banks March 7, 1991; Case IV/M. 963 
Compaq/Tandem August 11, 1997; Case IV/M. 977 Fujitsu/Amdahl September 8, 1997, Case IV/M.1069 
WorldCom/MCI 1997 OJ C 362 at 6 
58 Commission Press Release IP/971729, 30.07.97 and EUROPE, no 7022, 24.07.97 
59 FTC Press Release September 23, 1997 
60 Statement by Pitofsky and Commissioners Steiger, Starck and Varney, File No 971-0051, 1 July 1997 
61 IP/971729 of 30 July 1997, The Times July 23 1997 at 25 and 29 
62 EUROPE, no 7019, 18.07.1997 at 12 
63 EUROPE, no 7019, 18.07.1997 at 12 
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European Union and the government of the United States carried out consultations 
according to the 1991 Agreement on the application of their competition laws.64 
The Commission took into account, consistent with European Union law, concerns 
expressed by the United States Government relating to important defence interests and 
limited the scope of its action to the civil side of the operation. 65 In announcing the 
outcome of the affair, Mr. Karel van Miert, Competition Commissioner for the European 
Union stressed the importance of the co-operation agreement. Although the differences 
between the United States and European competition authorities were highly publicised, 
(European authorities looking at the effect on the Common Market and United States 
authorities at the benefit for consumers) most of the and mutually supportive interaction 
between the two competition authorities was unpublicised. Mr. van Miert also mentioned 
the solidarity shown by all the Member States in supporting the Commission. Individual 
Member States were not able to intervene and would probably not have been heard by 
Washington. The Commission on the other hand, by relying on Community law, was able 
to act effectively and avert a trade war. This case stressed the seriousness of the European 
Competition authorities to prevent anti-competitive conduct, as serious as the United 
States authorities are and have been in the past. 
As mentioned above, the Agreement on co-operation in competition matters between the 
European Union and the United States was tested to the limit in this case. Members of the 
United States Congress denounced the European approach to the case. Much of the verbal 
polemic focussed on the idea that the European Commission was trying to gain an unfair 
competitive advantage for Airbus, the troubled European consortium.66 In the meantime 
Boeing was hoping that the political pressure it created in the United States at the highest 
level would make the European Commission sway. 
The issue of whether to impose remedies or sanctions with respect to a "foreign" 
transaction (ie, foreign assets and operations) that has adverse "effects" within the 
Community was, for the first time raised in the Gencor/ Lonrho merger67, a concentration 
of South African platinum mining operations that was prohibited by the Commission. 
The Commission decision and the Court ruling raised many questions about the European 
Union's role in Africa. The Commission decided that the concentration was incompatible 
with the Common market, as it would have led to the creation of a dominant duopoly in 
the platinum and rhodium markets. The South African competition authorities cleared the 
concentration. 
On 25 March 1999, the EC Court of First Instance dismissed Gencor's application for the 
annulment of the European Commission's decision of 24 April 1996 under the EC Merger 
64 Supra, at 7 
65 Commission Press Release, IP/971729, 30.07.97 
66 The Lex Column, Financial Times, 22.07.97 
67 Supra, at 1 
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Regulation. One of the points raised in the case regarded the extra-territorial application 
of the Merger Regulation. 
In June 1995 Gencor and Lonhro announced their intention to merge their respective 
operations in the Platinum Group Metal sector. Both companies were to acquire joint 
control of Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd ("Imp lats") which was controlled by Gencor. In 
a second stage Implats was to have sole control of the two companies representing 
Lonhro's activities in the Platinum Group Metal sector in which, at the time, Lonhro was 
the majority shareholder with Implats holding 27%. 
Gencor argued that the Merger Regulation only applied to concentrations carried out 
within the Community and that the Commission did not have extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
In this case the economic activities were conducted within South Africa, a non-Member 
State. The Wood pulp test of implementation of an agreement in the European 
Community was not satisfied.68 It is arguable that a merger between two non-Community 
firms with exports to, but no operations or assets in the Community cannot be said to be 
implemented in the Community within the meaning of Wood pulp. Similarly, it argued 
that, if the test was whether the concentration had an immediate and substantial effect on 
competition within the Community, it was also not satisfied. 
The Court of First Instance dismissed these arguments stating that the parties carried out 
significant sales in the EC and that the Wood pulp test of implementation of an agreement 
in the EC was satisfied by mere sales within the EC. The Court noted that the Merger 
Regulation applied to all concentrations with a Community dimension (as defined in 
Article 1) even when the undertakings were not situated in the Community or the 
production activities covered by the concentration were carried out outside the 
Community. 
With regard to the criterion of turnover it was stated that the concentration did have a 
Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1 (2) of the Merger Regulation. The 
undertakings had an aggregate world-wide turnover of more than ECU 10 000 million 
above the 5 000 million threshold required by the Merger Regulation. Gencor and Lonhro 
each had a Community-wide turnover of more than ECU 250 million and they did not 
achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate Community-wide turnover within one 
and the same Member State. 
The Court further stated that the application of the Merger Regulation in this case was 
also justified under public international law where it is foreseeable that a proposed 
concentration will have an immediate and substantial effect in the Community. 
This ruling raised many questions about the European Union's role in Africa and the 
Commission's premise that it can have jurisdiction over multinational groups more than 
68 Ahlsrtom and Others v Commission (1988) European Court Reports 5193, paragraph 18 
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10,000km from Europe. In the Financial Times of 25 April 1996 it was reported that, 
contrary to the Commission's claim that South Africa had broadly supported its 
conclusions, reliable sources at Impala claimed that, although Mr. Thabo Mbeki had 
endorsed the merger, he was reported to have said that" the ANC has always been critical 
of anti-competitive behaviour among the biggest conglomerates and in general terms the 
Government would share the European Union's concerns, but that does not mean it 
accepts their jurisdiction". It should be noted that the South African authorities cleared 
the merger. 
The Commission kept the South African authorities informed throughout the 
investigation. Members of the European Competition authorities visited South Africa and 
representatives of the South African authorities attended the hearings organised in 
Brussels.69 Although no formal agreement of co-operation in competition matters exists 
between the European Union and South Africa, informal discussions were conducted 
throughout the investigation and ensured an amicable result. 
International law and comity issues arise when the Commission invokes its remedial 
powers under the Merger Regulation in transactions involving non-Community firms. 
Co-operation with foreign competition authorities is crucial to avoid unnecessary 
conflict7° 
Even where the Commission recognises that a concentration does not have an effect in 
Europe, it still exercises jurisdiction over concentrations. For example, in 
JCSAT/SAJAC,11 four Japanese companies formed a joint venture in Japan to provide 
telecommunications services in Japan. Because of the licensing and technical 
requirements associated with the provision of telecommunication services the 
Commission concluded that the "concentration has presently no effect on the 
Community" and "this situation is not likely to change". Nonetheless, the transaction fell 
under the jurisdiction of the Commission as granted by the Merger Regulation. It would 
have fallen outside the ambit of the European Union competition laws if, for example, the 
venture has been structured as a co-operative joint venture, since the application of 
Article 85 (which generally applies to co-operative joint ventures) requires an appreciable 
"effect" within the Community. 
2:5 "Effects"-principle. Comity and the application of European Union competition rules 
Neither the Wood pulp nor the Dyestuffs cases can be seen as endorsing the "effects"-
principle in the European Union.72 There appears to be little difference between anti-
competitive conduct outside the European Union "implemented" in the Common Market 
and the "effect" of such conduct in the Common Market for example, a refusal to export 
69 Commission Press Release IP/961346, 24.04.96 
70 Delta Air Lines/ Pan Am, IV/M 130 Sept. 13, 1991 
71 Case IV/M.346 Jun. 30, 1993 
72 Van Gerven "EC Jurisdiction in Anti-Trust matters: The Wood Pulp Judgement" 1989 Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute 451, 466-467 
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to the European Union or to buy from the European Union. In any case it seems most 
likely that the Commission will probably use the "effects"-theory in cases where there are 
no implementation within the European Union. Jones and Gonzalez-Diaz 73suggest that as 
far as concentrations are concerned, in reality there is little difference between the term 
"implemented" as used by the ECJ in Wood pulp on the one hand, and the test of direct, 
reasonably foreseeable and substantial effect as used by Advocate General Mayras in the 
Dyestuff case on the other hand. 
Regarding the application of the international principle of "comity", it should be noted 
that the European Union adheres to the OECD Guidelines and Recommendations. 
According to the 1986 Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Co-operation 
between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International 
Trade,74 the Member States of the European Union exercise moderation and restraint in 
the extra-territorial application of their competition laws and give effect to the principles 
of international law and comity 
This Recommendation was replaced by the 1995 version, which again recognised the 
need for Member countries to give effect to the principles of international law and comity 
and to use moderation and self-restraint in the interest of co-operation in the field of anti-
competitive practices. It recognises that anti-competitive investigations and proceedings 
by one Member country may affect important interests of other Member countries and 
that it is therefore important for Member countries to co-operate in the implementation of 
their respective national legislation in order to prevent the harmful effects of anti-
competitive practices. It also stresses the need for Member countries to co-operate in 
dealing with practices operated by enterprises situated in Member countries when they 
affect the interests of one or more other Member countries and have a harmful effect on 
international trade. The OECD consists, of 29 countries sharing the principles of market 
economy, democratic pluralism and respect for human rights. South Africa is not a 
member of the OECD, but this does not mean the OECD instruments are not open to 
South Africa. But the principles adopted by the OECD seem to be in line with the 
Competition Guidelines issued by the South African Government and the Reconstruction 
and Development Program.75 
In the Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe case76 the Commission, in asserting extra-
territorial jurisdiction held that comity does not militate against the exercise of 
jurisdiction because the application of Community law does not require any undertakings 
concerned to act in any way contrary to the requirements of their domestic laws, nor 
would the application of Community law adversely affect import interests of a non-
73 The Merger Regulation 1992 Ch 7 pp 88-91 
74 OECD Document Number C (86) 44 (Final), May 21, 1986 
74 Revised Recommendation of the Council concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on Anti-
competitive Practices affecting International Trade, 27 and 28 July 1995, COM (95) 130/FINAL 
75 Reconstruction and Development Programme, Forbes Magazine 
76 OJL 92/1, 48, 1985 
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Member State. Such an interest would have to be so important as to prevail over the 
fundamental interest of the Community that competition within the Common Market is 
not distorted. 
In the Wood pulp judgement the Court did not say much about international comity: 
"As regards the argument relating to disregard of international comity, it suffices to 
observe that it amounts to calling into question the Community's jurisdiction to apply its 
competition rules to conduct such as that found to exist in this case and that, as such, that 
argument already has been rejected."77 
This may indicate that the Court believes that international comity is an issue within the 
Commission's discretion. It should be noted that the Commission was involved in 
extensive negotiations with other countries in this case. Similarly, in the merger cases 
mentioned above, the Commission was involved in extensive informal discussions with 
foreign governments and Competition authorities. Whether this can be seen as a 
limitation on the Commission's powers or as international comity being an issue within 
the Commission's discretion is not clear. 
77 Supra, at 26 
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CHAPTER3 
THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTI-TRUST 
LAWS 
3: 1 Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act 
In United States v. Aluminium Co. of America (Alcoa) 78, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, acting for the Supreme Court, announced an "effects" test 
for establishing extra-territorial jurisdiction under the United States anti-trust laws. The 
Court was asked to dismiss a civil complaint brought by the American Anti-trust Division 
of the United States Department of Justice against a Canadian corporation that allegedly 
conspired with Alcoa to restrain commerce in the manufacture and sale of virgin 
aluminium ingot. It was alleged that the conspiracy was effected entirely outside the US. 
Judge Learned Hand stated that: "On the other hand, it is settled law .... that any state may 
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its 
borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends, and these 
liabilities other states will ordinarily recognise." He declared that the Sherman Act79 
prohibits extra-territorial conduct that is "intended to affect imports to the United States 
and did affect them. The fact that the undertakings concerned were situated outside the 
United States or that the agreement was concluded outside the United States was held to 
be immaterial. The Court in Alcoa required two elements: both an effect upon United 
States commerce and intent to affect United States commerce.80 
Theoretically, under Alcoa the Sherman Act may be applied to any form of conduct 
undertaken by any person anywhere, provided that such conduct is intended to have, and 
does in fact have an effect within the US. In the cases after Alcoa the "effects"- test was 
transformed into a "direct and substantial"-test.81 Alcoa can be seen as the most extreme 
assertion of United States extra-territorial jurisdiction. The jurisprudence from Alcoa to 
Hartford Insurance Co. has gradually narrowed the application of the Alcoa test. This can 
partly be subscribed to the many negative reactions to the Alcoa judgement in the 
international arena. 82 
78 148 F. 2d 416 2d Cir. 1945 
79 Sherman Act 1890 
80 Alcoa at 443-44 
81 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir.1976) and Hartford Insurance 
Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2909 
82 Demaret "L'extraterritorialite des lois et les relations transatlantiques: une question de droit ordre 
diplomatic" 1985/21 Revue Trimestrielle Droit Europeen 1-39 at 12 
Makins "Extra-territorial application of U.S. Anti-trust law" 1997 Tydskrifvir Suid Afrikaanse Reg 498-518 
Torremans "Extra-territorial Application of EC and US Competition Law" 1996 European Law Review. 
Page 26 of37 
In the 1978 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America83 decision, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the ninth Circuit held that the Alcoa "effects"-test is by itself 
incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interests. 
Judge Choy stated that: " A tripartite analysis seems to be indicated. As acknowledged 
above, the anti-trust laws require in first instance that there be some effect - actual or 
intended - on American foreign commerce before the Federal Courts may legitimately 
exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those statutes. 
Secondly, a greater showing of burden of restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that 
the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognisable injury to the plaintiffs and, 
therefore, a civil violation of anti-trust laws. 
Thirdly, there is the additional question which is unique to the international setting of 
whether the interests of and the links to the United States - including the magnitude of the 
effect on American foreign commerce - are sufficiently strong vis-a-vis those of other 
nations, to justify an assertion of extra-territorial authority"84 
The Court then adopted a "jurisdictional rule of reason" that involves evaluating and 
balancing relevant factors: "The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the 
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of 
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve 
compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with 
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American 
commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance of the alleged 
violation within the United States as compared with conduct abroad." This list was 
subsequently enlarged in the Mannigton Mills case when Judge Weiss set forth a non-
exhaustive list85 • The 1982 Foreign Trade Anti-trust Improvements Act (FTAIA) 
amended the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act86 to provide that 
challenged conduct in export commerce or wholly foreign conduct must have a "direct, 
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States domestic commerce or on 
the trade of a person engaged in export commerce. In 1987 the Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States adopted a Timberlane-like approach. 
In June 1993 the United States Supreme Court was again offered the opportunity to 
analyse the application of United States anti-trust law extra-territorially in Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co. v. California87• The action was brought by nineteen State Attorneys 
General and numerous private parties against United States insurance companies, London 
based reinsurance companies and other insurance industry entities. It was alleged that the 
Demetriou and Robertson "US Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters: Recent Developments" 
1995/5 European Competition Law Review at 461 
83 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.1976) 
84 Timberlane at 613 
85 Mannigton Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 595 F. 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979) 
86 15 U.S.C 45 (a)(3) 1988 & Supp. IV 1992 
87 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) 
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London reinsurers conspired with their American co-defendants to alter the American 
commercial general liability insurance market by agreeing to withhold insurance unless 
certain primary insurers made changes to the terms of Comprehensive General Liability 
insurance policies. In the trial Court, the London reinsurers moved to dismiss the claims 
on the grounds that their alleged conduct took place outside the United States and 
therefore beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. And even if this was not the case, then 
the principle of comity required the Court to refuse jurisdiction. The Court agreed. 
The decision was reversed on appeal. It was decided that the United States Courts have 
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act over foreign conduct that was meant to produce and 
did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States. 88 If such an effect is 
present, a true conflict between the United States and foreign law would serve as the basis 
for a consideration of whether that conflict requires abstention from the exercise of 
jurisdiction. A true conflict only arises when the foreign law requires the defendant to act 
in a fashion prohibited by United States law, or compliance with the laws of the United 
States and the defendant's country is otherwise impossible. 89 
The majority did not take comity into account as part of the rules on the basis of which 
the court asserts jurisdiction. "Concerns of comity come into play, if at all, only after a 
court has determined that the exact complaint are subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction"90 • 
Instead they stated that comity could only be taken into account once the Court had 
established its jurisdiction. Even in such cases comity would only influence the outcome 
if there existed a true conflict between United States and foreign law. Judge Scalia and 
his dissenting colleagues reacted that "the majority's holding will bring the Sherman Act 
and other laws into sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other 
foreign countries - particularly our closets trading partners." 
3 :2 Mergers and Joint Ventures 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the direct or indirect acquisition by one person of 
all or any part of the stock or assets of another person where in any line of commerce or 
in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the United States, the effect of such 
acquisition may be substantially to lesson competition or tend to create a monopoly.91 
Thus, transactions by firms outside the United States are covered if they affect United 
States commerce. If, however, the only anti-competitive effects of the transaction are 
outside of the United States, section 7 does not apply. 
The Hard-Scott-Rodino-Act requires that parties to certain large mergers and corporate 
joint ventures notify the Anti-trust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal 
88 Hartford Insurance Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2909 
89 Id. at 2910-1911 
90 Suora at 88 
91 15 U.S.C. 18 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) 
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Trade Commission of their proposed transaction and wait for stated periods of time 
before consummating the transaction. The financial thresholds for notification apply to 
transactions by foreign companies outside the United States. The implementing 
regulations exempt certain situations92 
The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have sued foreign firms for 
failing to report transactions under the Hard-Scott Radian Act and sued a foreign 
company for the first time in 1993 for failing to notify its acquisition of other foreign 
companies with significant sales in the United Sates.93 
In 1988 the Justice Department issued Anti-trust Enforcement Guidelines for 
International Operations which contain illustrative cases relating to merger analysis. One 
of these cases deals specifically with the merger of two foreign firms and states that the 
Justice Department will not challenge an anti-competitive merger abroad unless one or 
both of the entities has United States production facilities or substantial distribution of 
assets in the United States.94 
3:3 Comity. the "effects':'-prihciple and the United States assertion of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction 
International law has for some time recognised the validity of an "effects" -test to assert 
jurisdiction and the limitations on such assertion. 
Already in the Alcoa case Judge Hand stated that the Sherman Act is not applicable to 
anti-competitive conspiracies not intended to affect United States commerce and not, in 
fact, affecting United States commerce. He continued: "Because of the international 
complication likely to arise from an effort in this country to treat such agreements as 
unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover 
them."95 
The international complication did rise, and in many circumstances, because of the strict 
application of the effects test or even a direct and substantial ''effects" -test. It caused great 
controversy between the United States and United Kingdom and lead Lord Denning to 
observe in British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries: "The writ of the 
United States Courts doesn't run in this country, and if due regard is to be had to the 
comity of nations, it will not seek to run here."96 South Africa has also not escaped the 
strict application of United States anti-trust law, for example the take-over by Minorco of 
92 15 U.S.C. 18(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) 
93 United States v Anova Holding AG 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) par.70,383 
94 International Guidelines 4 Trade Register Report (CCH) 13, 109, 55 Anti-trost & Trade Register Report. 
(BNA) No. 1391 at S-3 
95 Alcoa at 416, 443 
96 (1954) 3 All England Reports. at 88. 
Lowe "Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading Interests Act" 1981 
American Journal of International Law 257 
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Consolidated Goldfields of the United Kingdom97 and the Westinghouse dispute 
regarding the uranium market price interference. 98 
Dissatisfaction with the strict application of the "effects" -principle has led to a tempering 
via considerations of international comity. In 1997 in United States v. Nippon Paper 
Industries Co. Ltd. 99 a United States Court of Appeals in Boston decided that United 
States anti-trust law applies, in the criminal context, to a price fixing conspiracy that 
occurred, in Japan, but was intended to and did have adverse effects in the United States. 
This was the first time that a Federal Court of Appeals extended Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act to wholly extra-territorial criminal conduct. Nippon argued that the doctrine of 
international comity should shield it from prosecution. The Court held that comity is 
more an aspiration than a rule, more a grace than obligation. It reaffirmed its decision by 
stating that the alleged acts against Nippon were illegal under both American and 
Japanese law. The principle that states should give due regard to the legitimate interests 
of other states and arrange their conduct in a conforming way is known as comity. 
Comity does not explain whether a state has jurisdiction over extra-territorial conduct, but 
whether a state ought to exercise already-existing extra-territorial jurisdiction. Before 
jurisdiction is established the matter of comity is totally irrelevant. In order to establish 
the legal basis of a state's assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction, the fact that one state 
may have a greater interest in the subject matter of the litigation makes no difference. 
While states are under no international law rule obligation to account for comity in the 
exercise of their international affairs it may certainly be in their own interest and an 
advancement of the international public order to do so.rn° 
97 Consolidated Goldfields PLC v Minorco SA 871 F 2d 252 (1989) 
98 Westinghouse Electric Corporation v Rio Algom Ltd 617 F2d 1248 (7th Cir 1980) 
99 C.A. lNo. 96-2001 
100 Reuland "Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Comity, and the Extraterritorial Reach of United States Antitrust 
Laws" 1994 Texas International Law Journal 180 
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CHAPTER4 
LESSONS FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES 
4.1 Problems facing the South African competition authorities in the extra-territorial 
application of its competition laws 
4.1.1 Interfering with sovereignty. 
In the Gencor/Lohnro merger101 the South African competition authority had already 
taken a decision by the time the European Competition Commission stopped the merger. 
Similarly in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger'02 the United States authorities had 
already taken a positive decision before the Commission was due to give its views. Can 
this not be seen as a breach of the principle of non-interference under international law, 
especially in the light of the other "domestic" issues surrounding the mergers? In the 
Boeing case103 employment and defence played a major role in the authorities' 
investigation. It is interesting to note that the principle of non-interference was 
unsuccessfully invoked in the Wood pulp case. 104 The Court dismissed it as the rule would 
only mean that a state is required to exercise its jurisdiction with moderation if a person 
(or a company) is subject to "contradictory orders as to the conduct it must adopt". 105 
The United States faced several problems in dealing with the hostile response of foreign 
nations to its assertion of jurisdiction in competition matters relating to foreign 
companies. It cannot escape the fact that many markets (especially, former communist 
ones) are growing in importance. Disregard for the comity of nations and the international 
law principle of sovereignty will not be tolerated by other nations. Comity is relied on 
especially in order to consider the interests of foreign nations. 
4.1.2 Trade friction with main trading partners. 
The assertion of jurisdiction over companies situated outside the jurisdiction of a state is 
bound to have repercussions. The Boeing case106 offers a good example of how extra 
territorial enforcement of competition matters can lead to conflicts between regulators 
and political embarrassment for governments. The contradictory decisions in Europe and 
101 Supra, at 1 
102 Supra, at 2 
103 Supra, at 2 
104 Supra, at 26 
105 Bavasso "Boeing/McDonnell Douglas: Did the Commission Fly too High?" 1998 European Competition 
Law Review. 24 7 
106 Supra, at 2 
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in the United States laid bare the risks of an international crisis with inherent political as 
well as legal implications. We have seen the extent to which the Boeing merger 107 was 
played out in the international press. In the Nippon case108 for example, it was seen as 
rather peculiar that a Japanese company was the first target of stricter United States 
competition rules, in the light of the United States trade deficit with that country. 
4.1.3 International agreements 
South Africa does not have any bilateral agreements regarding competition matters with 
other countries. This obviously can create difficulties obtaining evidence, the co-
ordination of investigations and general co-operation in a competition matter. Apparently 
the South African Department of Trade and Industry is involved in bilateral and 
multilateral talks aimed at facilitating the application of competition law internationally. 
At the moment there exists a lack of international competition standards and/or an 
international competition authority, which means that there is no real guidance as to the 
application of extra-territorial jurisdiction in competition matters. 
4.1.4 Applying domestic competition rules to anti-competitive practices with an 
international dimension 
It is quite common that a country which has implemented comprehensive competition 
policies nonetheless lack the necessary instruments to apply domestic competition rules 
to anti-competitive practices with an international dimension. Information central to the 
investigation may be located outside its jurisdiction. 
It has been proven that since the European Union and United States 1991 Agreement109 on 
co-operation their exists a greater awareness by case-handlers of what their counterparts 
are doing, which is a result of more frequent personal contact and informal exchanges of 
view on the difference for example in analysing product markets. Discussions on the 
geographical market, for example, tends to be limited as usually the Commission and the 
United States agencies concentrate on the competitive effects of the transaction on their 
own markets. Different geographic markets mean that the products presenting 
competition problems are different for each authority. 
4.1.5 Examination by different authorities at the same time 
International mergers, strategic alliances and joint ventures, for example may face 
examination by different authorities at the same time. Divergence in the laws applicable 
to the same set of facts may result in conflicting conclusions as to the legality of the same 
behaviour. The remedy in each jurisdiction may also be incompatible. The review of 
commercial practices involves considerable work and costs, both for competition 
authorities and the businesses involved. The parallel activities of several national anti-
107 Supra, at 2 
108 Supra, at 3 
109 Supra, at 7 
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trust agencies or courts involving crossborder competition cases can be a costly affair for 
the enterprises involved. Direct costs relating to multi jurisdictional merger review 
include professional advisors' fees, management time and filing fees. Indirect costs 
include the efficiencies lost by delayed transactions, enforcement errors and business 
uncertainty. 
4.1.6 Legal Uncertainty 
The business community is concerned about multiple assertions of jurisdiction. This can 
create great uncertainty because of the increased likelihood of the application of 
inconsistent legal standards and inconsistent remedies. 
4.1. 7 Specific problems: Export Cartels 
Certain practices are difficult to tackle for example export cartels. Export cartels create 
specific problems insofar as their negative effects are only felt in the market of the 
importing country, while the relevant information is situated in the exporting country. 
The latter, of course, has neither an interest nor the jurisdiction to take action. 
4:2 Cross-Border competition issues: Possible solutions 
4.2.l "Effects"-Principle 
It is important for the South African competition authority to define clearly the "effects"-
principle as it will be applied in South Africa. Will it be limited by international law 
principles or comity? One way of doing this is through issuing of "Guidelines" as was 
done in Germany, to clarify the extra-territorial scope of their merger provisions. 
In the light of the United States and European Union experience, it is unlikely that the 
South African legislature had an unrestricted application of the "effects"-principle in 
mind. Such an interpretation could lead to constant embarrassment in the future. The 
limitations must be sought in the Act itself. In this regard the purpose of the Act is: 
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy; 
(b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices; 
( c) to promote employment and advance the social economic welfare of South Africans; 
( d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the republic; 
( e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and 
(f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. 
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If the "effect" of the "economic activity" falls within the scope of the "purpose" of the 
Competition Act, competition cannot be said to be restricted. 
4.2.2 Sovereignty 
It is essential to take account of the sovereign interests of other states in order to avert 
possible trade wars or unnecessary trade friction. Many examples can be found relating to 
the initial aggressive assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
authorities in anti-trust matters. The United States now follows a "rule of reason" 
approach. This rule requires that in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction in 
accordance with the notion of comity, a Court is to balance the interests of the states 
involved and refrain from exercising jurisdiction where the interests of the foreign state 
"outweigh" the interests of the United States. 
4.2.3 Comity1 10 
Positive comity is a law based anti-trust procedure that can promote competition and 
defuse some tension by providing a systematic law-based approach to fact gathering, 
reporting and bilateral consultation between anti-trust authorities. On 4 June 1998 the 
Positive Comity Agreement was signed between the European Union and the United 
States111 
Positive comity in a South African context would create the means for the South African 
competition authority to ensure investigations and remedies in another country according 
to the competition laws of that country. In this sense positive comity can alleviate the 
need for extra-territorial enforcement that could lead to international confrontations. 
Negative comity consists of a doctrine of politeness and good manners between nations, 
according to which a sovereign country, in case of a transnational violation, can in certain 
situations decide not to apply its laws and leave it to the authority of the other country 
where significant interests of that foreign country might otherwise be affected. 
Positive comity differs from negative comity in that it consists in positive acts in co-
operation and reciprocal assistance between national anti-trust authorities. 
110 See also Chapter 2 and 3 relating to the principle of"comity" 
111 Financial Times 5 June 1998, EUROPE 5 June 1998, OJ L 173, 18.6.1998 and Atwood "Positive 
Comity - Is it a Positive Step?" Fordham Corporate Law Institute 1993 ed (1992) 
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4.2.4 Expert groups 
The establishment of expert groups, arranged according to business activities, in order to 
address competition problems in a given market is important. Problems like pressure 
from international firms to participate in cartel activities and non-compliance with 
"essential facility" rules can then be detected at an early stage. 
4.2.5 Co-operation and consultation 
On 24 March 1999 a development and co-operation agreement between South Africa and 
the European Union was approved. 112 The agreements provide for the establishment of a 
bilateral free trade area between the European Union and South Africa in conformity with 
World Trade Organisation rules. Although the Agreement does not contain specific 
clauses relating to competition it can be seen as a sign of the importance of good trade 
relations with the European Union. In all competition cases with a foreign element 
informal discussions were held with the relevant parties resulting in amicable solutions. It 
is important for South Africa to participate in bilateral and multilateral discussions 
relating to competition issues. 
Even if South Africa does not initially participate in all the provisions of an international 
competition mechanism, we would be beneficiaries of the enhanced control over anti-
competitive practices with an international dimension. Insofar as competition rules can 
ensure that investments are fair, effective competition structures can support liberal 
investment regimes. 
Early consultations with other authorities for example, can ascertain the degree of 
flexibility in a particular matter. 
There have been many initiatives in the past to establish international rules on anti-
competitive conduct. The 1947 Havana Charter was one of the first containing rules 
covering restrictive practices. The Charter was never ratified. It was followed by the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, which examined the trade-competition interface 
a few times, also with no clear result. 113 
In the l 970's a full competition Code was finally negotiated in the framework of 
UNCTAD at the request of developing countries. However, its provisions are not binding 
and therefore not taken serious. 114 The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs was 
superseded by the World Trade Organisation on 1 January 1995 and in recent years the 
World Trade Organisation has been seen as the most appropriate forum for the 
112 JP/991195, 25.03.99 
113 GA TT BISD 7S/29, 9S/28, 170 
114 United Nations Document A/35/48 (1980) 
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development of internationally agreed anti-trust rules. 115 Generally one can say the 
European Union are much more in favour of World Trade Organisation involvement that 
the United States. 116 
115 Keynote Address by Rt. Hon Sir Leon Brittan QC Vice President of the European Commission, OECD 
Conference on Trade and Competition, Paris 29-30 June 1999 Reprinted in European Commission Press 
Release /P/961523 of June 18, 1996, Financial Times, 24.09.1996, Commission Communication of 17 June 
1996: Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules, COM (96) 284, 18.06.1996 
116 Demetriou and Robertson "Extra-territorial Jurisdiction in Anti-trust Matters: Recent Developments" 
1995/8 European Competition Law Review. 461 
Tarullo "Wrong Lesson from Boeing" Financial Times, Aug.13, 1997 
Bourke "Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules" European Financial Services Law, 
August/September 1996 
Communication from the Commission to the Council "Towards an International Framework of 
Competition Rules, COM(96) 284, 18.06.1996 
Cocuzza and Montini "International Co-operation in a Global Economy, 3/1998 European Competition 
Law Review 156 
Bourke "Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules" 1996 European Financial Services 
Law, August/September 
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CONCLUSION 
South African competition law has long recognised that the regulation of anti-competitive 
conduct is important to the South African economic process. The South African 
competition authority, comprising the Competition Commission, the Competition 
Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court, stand at a departure point on the road of 
international competition. Behind it is the legacy of "apartheid'', limits on investments, 
protection of a certain class of businesses, before it lies the relaxation of economic 
controls and investment opportunities for foreigners and South Africans. Unfortunately, 
this freedom brings with it possibilities of economic abuse. The globalisation of business 
activities will lead to an increase in competition cases with an international dimension. 
International competition cases raise difficult challenges for competition law 
enforcement, which can only be solved efficiently through enhanced international co-
operation. It is therefore essential for the South African competition authorities to create 
an impressive presence not only in South Africa, but also in the world trade arena. 
International and national businesses and foreign competition authorities should know the 
extremely wide application and effect of the South African Competition Act. 
It would be beneficial for South Africa to adopt an international approach in the extra-
territorial application of its competition rules and in this respect, the lessons learnt from 
the European Union and the United States, in applying their competition rules outside 
their jurisdiction, should not be ignored. It is important to apply the competition rules in a 
matter consistent with international trade practices to avoid trade wars or unnecessary 
hostility. Consideration of another state's sovereignty, consideration of its competition 
rules, consideration of international free trade and the advancement of the world economy 
are essential principles to adhere to. 
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